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Abstract
In Africa, food systems intersect with dynamics such as demographic growth, urbanisation, and climate change, as African
food systems are key drivers of livelihood provision, development, and human-environment interactions. The governance
of African food systems shapes how food systems are changing as a response to these dynamics, which will have impor-
tant social, economic, and ecological impacts for generations of Africans. This article positions large land investments in
food system changes in central Kenya and northern Mozambique based on a large-scale household survey and interviews,
and uses these findings to debate the concept of food democracy. Large land investments contributed to more modern
food systems, which impacted land availability, household’s engagement in agriculture, and supply chains. These changes
shifted power and control in local food systems. But even in the ‘extreme’ example of land investments, local perspectives
challenge what could, and could not, be included in a democratic food system.
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1. Introduction
In Africa, food systems intersect with challenges such as
demographic growth, urbanisation, and climate change,
as African food systems are key drivers of livelihood pro-
vision, development, and human-environment interac-
tions. The governance of African food systems shapes
how food systems are changing as a response to these
challenges, which will have important social, economic,
and ecological impacts for generations of Africans. Today,
there are strong debates regarding different food gover-
nance approaches, each with varying degrees of inclu-
sion and participation, that are likely to result in differ-
ent food systems. Examples of such food governance de-
bates include food sovereignty and food democracy.
Conventional food governance approaches implic-
itly contribute to shifts of Africa’s ‘traditional’ food sys-
tems to more Western and ‘modern’ food systems. In
traditional food systems, the population engaged in
agriculture is high, food production is mostly small-
scale and low on external inputs, food distribution is
mostly through informal chains, and malnutrition is
mostly undernourishment and undernutrition. In mod-
ern food systems, most food production is energy and
input-intensive, and labour-extensive, while supermar-
kets have more market share, and overweight and obe-
sity are widespread (Drewnowski & Popkin, 2009; High
Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition
[HLPE], 2017). Shifting from traditional to modern food
systems comes not only with wide-ranging economic, so-
cial, and ecological impacts, but alsowith changed power
relations between food system actors.
An example of this conventional approach, and one
of the most contentious topics in African food systems,
is the phenomenon of Large Agricultural Investments
(LAIs), popularised as ‘land grabs.’ The LAIs involve ac-
quisitions of land rights, mostly in developing countries,
which has caused debates concerning the advantages
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and disadvantages for local communities. While consid-
erable concern was raised concerning the LAI’s impact
on land, livelihoods, and environment, scant evidence ex-
ists on their effects on the structure of the local food
systems and the control of local people (Di Matteo &
Schoneveld, 2016; Li, 2011; Oberlack, Tejada, Messerli,
Rist, & Giger, 2016). The LAIs phenomenon fits a mod-
ernistic development trajectory characterised by large-
scale monoculture and internationally traded products,
and can be a strong driver of local food system change
(Borras & Franco, 2012). As LAIs are perceived to mod-
ernise the local food systems, they provide a unique op-
portunity to add empirical findings to discuss the con-
ventional approach to food system change. Furthermore,
these empirical findings can be used to reflect on the
food governance arrangements, such as food democracy,
best suited to respond to dynamics such as demographic
growth, urbanisation, and climate change.
In this regard, this article aims to position the con-
cept of food democracy in food system changes in cen-
tral Kenya and northern Mozambique through the case
of LAIs. Based on the analysis of large-scale household
surveys and interviews, the following research questions
were answered: (1) To what extent, and how, were the
food systems of households different, and does the dif-
ference relate to the presence of LAIs?; (2) What were
the implications for food democracy of those changes?
The overall goal was to provide evidence on the direct
and indirect impacts of LAIs on food systems in central
Kenya and northern Mozambique, and use food democ-
racy to reflect on these changes. In turn, this reflection
will show the limitations of food democracy.
The article is structured as follows: Section 2 dis-
cusses food democracy, food systems change and land
investments in Africa. Section 3 describes the conceptual
framework, introduces the study areas, and clarifies the
data collection procedures. Section 4 presents data of
land investments’ impact on the studied food systems
in Kenya and Mozambique, and discusses the implica-
tions for food democracy. Section 5 concludes with rec-
ommendations for future research.
2. Food Democracy, Systems Change and Land
Investments
2.1. Food Democracy and Systems Change
In the 1990s, Tim Lang coined the term ‘food democracy’
as a response to the perceived concentration of power
and control in food systems by ‘Big Food’ corporations
(Booth & Coveney, 2015), especially in the mid-stream
(Reardon, 2015). Food democracy presents an alterna-
tive food governance framework centred on societies,
communities, and citizens (Goodman, 2014; Hassanein,
2003). At its core, food democracy is:
The idea that people can and should be actively par-
ticipating in shaping the food system, rather than
remaining passive spectators on the sidelines. In
other words, food democracy is about citizens hav-
ing the power to determine agro-food policies and
practices locally, regionally, nationally, and globally.
(Hassanein, 2003, p. 79)
Thus, food democracy is a process where people regain
control and participate (Booth & Coveney, 2015), with a
key role for local spaces (Perrett & Jackson, 2015).
Authors on food democracy identified drivers that
led to the loss of control and participation and projected
how amore democratic food systemwould look. Control
and participation are declining due to increasing corpo-
rate control, limited information to consumers, the dom-
inance of supermarkets, and convenient food products
that replace traditional food (Hassanein, 2008). A demo-
cratic food systemwould resist big food corporations and
ultra-processed foods, reject genetically modified organ-
isms, produce through sustainable methods, and recon-
nect producers and consumers (Booth & Coveney, 2015;
Hassanein, 2008; Lang, 2005; Levkoe, 2006). Examples of
food democracy include community-supported agricul-
ture and local food councils (Hassanein, 2003; Johnston,
Biro, & MacKendrick, 2009).
Food democracy is not the only alternative food
governance framework that emerged from the 1990s.
Although overlapping, food democracy and food
sovereignty differ in program and grassroots base. Unlike
food democracy, food sovereignty has a program that
is strongly focused on agrarian reform, which is partly
adopted in legislation of countries such as Bolivia, Mali,
andNepal (Schiavoni, 2017). Food sovereignty has strong
grassroots movements, and origins, in the developing
world (Edelman, 2014), which results in more emphasis
on ‘traditional’ food systems compared to food democ-
racy. A pan-African food sovereignty alliance is sup-
plemented by national food sovereignty movements,
whereas food democracy lacks term recognition and a
popular movement in Africa. Now, food sovereignty is
challenged for its ambiguity and applicability in more
pluralistic, complex, and less rural societies and food
systems (Dekeyser, Korsten, & Fioramonti, 2018). The in-
creased complexity of African food systems encourages
more attention to food democracy for the analysis of
power and control, as citizens’ control and participation
are more easier to enact than food sovereignty.
In Africa, societies and food systems are transforming
towards increased pluralism and complexity. African soci-
eties are changing rapidly through demographic changes,
economic growth, and climate change (Christiaensen,
2017). The ‘traditional’ food systems are under pressure
from an inroad of supermarkets, land investments, and
urbanisation (Gómez & Ricketts, 2013). These pressures
result in many food system changes, including shifting
malnutrition, more food purchases, and more land com-
petition (HLPE, 2017; May, 2018). Generally, ‘traditional’
food systems are changing towards more ‘modern’ food
systems (HLPE, 2017). Lang (2005) provides a spectrum
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of the modern food system, where one side is ‘food con-
trol,’ with long-distance trade and large farms, and the
other side is ‘food democracy,’ with local trade and small
farms. The food control side has lower citizen’s control
and participation than the food democracy side, in part
because of differences in large versus small farms, long-
distance food versus local food, hypermarkets versus
street markets, and dominance of sugar and fat-dense di-
ets versus nutrient-diverse diets.
It is unlikely that the transition from traditional to
modern is linear and uniform, and that citizens’ control
automatically decreases. For example, Abrahams (2009)
found the growth of traditional food distribution along-
side a developing modern distribution in Zambia, while
policymakers included more farmers into their food dis-
tribution policies in Uganda. The aggregated statistics on
food systems change rarely capture these competing dy-
namics (van der Ploeg, 2018). Thus, case studies can pro-
vide needed empirical validation on food systems change.
2.2. Land Investments
Oneof themost contentious topics of change, power and
control in African food system is the LAI phenomenon,
popularised through the term ‘land grabs.’ The term LAIs
better capture the complexities of the current surge in
agri-investments than land grabs (Hall, 2011). Within the
wave of LAIs, land rights for more than 42.2 million ha
worldwide were transferred between 2000 and 2016
(Nolte, Chamberlain, Giger, & Wilson, 2016), which is a
much higher rate of land transfer than those in the past
decades (Deininger, 2011). In this article, the LAIs are not
only ‘transfers of rights to use, control, or own land from
smallholder households or communities to corporate ac-
tors…through sale, lease, or concession of areas larger
than 200 ha’ (Oberlack et al., 2016, p. 154), but also re-
fer to the size of capital investment and labour employed
(Zaehringer, Wambugu, Kiteme, & Eckert, 2018).
A transfer of ownership is rare; most of these land
deals are leases with a duration that is up to 50 or 99
years (Cotula, 2013). Land investment in Africa is driven
by the large amount of perceived available land and
weak land rights (Deininger, 2011), increased demand
and prices for food, energy systems transitions, biodi-
versity conservation, climate change responses, geopoli-
tics and development strategies (Oberlack et al., 2016).
In Africa, LAIs drive specific land-use change, which
can shift food crops for self-consumption to cash crops,
food crops to biofuels, or convert non-food lands such
as forests to food production or biofuels (Borras &
Franco, 2012). The LAIs are associated with business
models that range from independent farmers, coopera-
tives, 1000-day speculative farming, asset management,
contracting, and agribusinessmodels (Boche & Anseeuw,
2013). These business models are ‘frequently associated
with industrial agricultural production methods, domi-
nated by transnational corporations producing for ex-
port’ (Clapp, 2015, p. 307). The primary types of investor
worldwide and in Africa are private companies (45% of
total area worldwide) and stock exchange-listed compa-
nies (32%; Nolte et al., 2016).
Within the LAIs debate, proponents argue the oppor-
tunities that LAIs can bring to local communities and ru-
ral development through a greater access to capital, tech-
nology, knowledge and markets, while LAIs projects can
contribute to economic growth and national government
revenue (Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009;
Deininger & Xia, 2016). However, whether the recipient
countries have the capacity to manage these land deals
is doubted (de Schutter, 2011). African land rights are
often vague, and local communities might be excluded
from the negotiations, which heightens the risk of con-
flicts between local communities and investors (Cotula
et al., 2009). LAIs exacerbate existing tensions as they tra-
verse formal, customary, ethnic and historical relation-
shipswithin changing rural landscapes. For the local com-
munities, who wins and who loses from LAIs is differen-
tiated by class, gender, education, age, nationality, and
religion. In short:
While, in principle, investments in large production
units or higher up in the agricultural value chain can
have very positive effects on neighboring small farm-
ers, systematic evidence of the size of such effects
remains scant, limiting the scope for evidence-based
policy-making. (Deininger & Xia, 2016, p. 228)
3. Framework, Material and Methods
3.1. Framework
This article aimes to position the concept of food democ-
racy in food system changes in central Kenya and north-
ern Mozambique through the case of LAIs. The change
of food systems by LAIs is approached through a case
study design with a counterfactual group. The dynamic
of LAIs is used as an ‘extreme’ case study that could trans-
form local food systems towards more modernity. For
this article, there was a focus on the food supply chains,
food environments, and dietary shifts (Figure 1). The
conceptual framework links LAIs with dietary changes
through five hypothesised steps. First, the LAIs would
decrease land availability (i.e., the stock of land that
is available in a locality) and access (i.e., household’s
land access), and provide certain off-farm employment
opportunities. Second, the decreased land availability
and access, and time taken by off-farm employment,
would decrease agri-engagement. Third, decreased agri-
engagement and time taken by off-farm employment
would result in more market dependence for a house-
hold’s dietary needs. Fourth, in turn, more market inte-
gration would lead to more market development. Fifth,
as the market would provide different food (e.g., more
energy-dense products) than what a household would
grow (e.g., more staple crops), the integration and devel-
opment of markets would lead to dietary changes.
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Figure 1. Conceptual framework illustrating hypothesised linkage of large agricultural investments and diet changes.
Food democracy is used to reflect on the changes de-
picted in Figure 1, which will feed into a discussion on
the concept of food democracy. First, Lang’s (2005) food
democracy conceptualisation, which is characterised by
small farms, local food, street markets, and lower preva-
lence of sugar and fat-dense foods, is used to discuss
the shifts in power and control in food systems by LAIs.
Thus, this part reflects on the changes in food democ-
racy induced by LAIs through the prevalence of Lang’s
characteristics. Second, the assumption that increased
citizen power and control will lead to a food system
with Lang’s characteristics is discussed. The outcome of
this reflection examines food democracy as an outcome,
exemplified by small farms, local food, street markets,
and lower prevalence of sugar and fat-dense foods, and
food democracy as a process, where increased citizen’s
power and control is not linked to a particular food sys-
tem arrangement.
3.2. Study Areas
The study areas were situated around Nanyuki, central
Kenya, and in the Gurué and Monapo Districts, northern
Mozambique (Figure 2). First, the two countries were se-
lected according to their different LAIs dynamics, such as
land-extensive or land-intensive, as this is likely to gener-
ate different food system changes. Second, the regions
and study areas within each country were selected ac-
cording to their prevalence of LAIs.
Kenya has a long-standing tripartite relationship be-
tween state, agribusiness, and smallholders (Oya, 2012).
The sector is dominated by small-scale farmers that pro-
vide 75% of all outputs, but the average plot is ever
decreasing in size (Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations [FAO], 2018). Kenya’s agricultural sec-
tor struggles with shifting weather patterns, population
growth, changing demographics, and political instabil-
ity (D’Alessandro, Caballero, Lichte, & Simpkin, 2015).
While British colonial rule (1895–1963) and its grab-
bing of land created much landlessness, Kenyan politi-
cal elites used land redistribution after independence to
mobilise communities and to grab land for themselves
and their patronage. Land and ethnic linkages are still
used for mobilisation (Médard, 2010). The population in
Kenya is estimated to double in the next 27 years, push-
ing the agricultural frontier into more marginal areas
and increasing tensions with pastoralists (FAO, 2017). In
short, relatively high population densities squeezes land
Figure 2. Location of the study areas in Kenya (Nanyuki)
and Mozambique (Monapo and Gurué).
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availability, which was already skewed by colonial history
and post-colonial patronage. This results in farmers occu-
pying small plots of land that perform under their pro-
ductive potential and contribute to their poverty trap
(Deininger, 2011; Ulrich, 2014).
Kenya’s LAI potential is characterised as ‘little land
available, high yield gap’ (Deininger, 2011). Generally,
Kenyan elites sell former colonial farms to investors,
which does not cause land dispossession, and are thus
rarely recorded in international land monitoring initia-
tives (Klopp & Lumumba, 2014).
In Kenya, the ‘factual’ study area, which contains the
LAIs, stretches from Tigithi along Mount Kenya to Timau,
and includes the sub-locations Buuri, Tigithi, Kangaita,
Nyaringinu, and Naibor. In this area, large farms are the
major employers of the region (Ulrich, 2014). Sources
of contention related to the large farms were the shar-
ing of scarce water between small and large farmers, the
wage of workers on large farms, and the impacts of the
floriculture’s extensive use of chemicals on the health of
workers and surrounding communities (Lanari, Liniger, &
Kiteme, 2016). The LAIs types in these areas include flori-
culture and horticulture. The counterfactual area was
Barrier, which lies approximately 10 km from the nearest
LAI and has similar demographics as the factual areas.
In Mozambique, about 75% of its 29 million people
are involved in agriculture,mostly on small plots. In 2012,
99.8%ofMozambique’s fourmillion farmswere between
0.1 and 10 ha, and small-scale farmers occupied 90% of
cultivated land (Oya, 2012). As a result, small-scale farm-
ing is crucial for livelihood provision and food security.
However, the average small farm shrank between 2002
and 2014 (Deininger & Xia, 2016). After public consulta-
tion, Mozambique adopted in 1997 one of the most pro-
gressive land laws in the world. While the state provides
formal land rights, customary land rights have full legal
equivalence. This provision protects land users in a coun-
try with a low degree of formalised title deeds (Cotula
et al., 2009). However, practical registration of land rights
and enforcement of the land laws are lacking (Tanner,
2010). The Mozambican elites benefit from this lack of
implementation to facilitate land dispossession, either
for their personal projects or to enable foreign investors
to access land (Milgroom, 2015). Mozambique ranks as
a top recipient country for LAIs (Nolte et al., 2016). The
pull factors for land investments in Mozambique include
high yield gaps, low population density, and ‘plentiful
suitable’ land (Deininger, 2011).
The first Mozambican study area was situated in the
Gurué region, which is located in the Zambezia Province.
The factual study area was Manlé town, which is about
15 km east from Gurué town. Manlé’s adjoining tea plan-
tations were established under colonial rule. With the
1990s civil war, the plantation declined, and small-scale
farmers worked the unused land. Recently, the company
expanded on their former lands and dispossessed the
small-scale farmers. The counterfactual town of Muela
was situated south of Gurué with no LAIs present within
20 km. Muela connected to the main road through a
dirt path and had similar demographics as Manlé. The
secondMozambican study area was situated in Monapo,
which is part of the Nampula Province. The factual study
area was Monapo town, which adjoins a former colo-
nial sisal plantation. This plantation ceased activity be-
tween 1970 and the 1990s, and small-scale farmers cul-
tivated on the idle land. In 2005, a new company bought
the former plantation and expelled the small-scale farm-
ers. The counterfactual site was Canacué town, to the
south of Monapo town, which had similar demographics
as Ramiane.
3.3. Data Collection
The data were collected between February 2016 and
March 2017 through a livelihood and food security sur-
vey, which was approached differently in the two coun-
tries. In Kenya, stratified random sampling selected 488
heads of households, while inMozambique random sam-
pling selected 376 heads of households (Table 1). In the
Kenyan study region, five sub-locations (Buuri, Tigithi,
Kangaita, Nyaringinu, and Naibor) around a LAI were se-
lected to represent the business types of LAIs in these ar-
eas. Within these areas, 318 households were randomly
selected. Another sub-location, Barrier, was selected as
a counterfactual area, and 170 households were ran-
domly selected. For each household, a weight was at-
tributed to each household proportionally to the total
number of households of the sub-location. As a result,
the analysis is representative of thewhole studied region
(Reys et al., 2018). When weighted, the Kenyan survey
represented 6692 households. In Mozambique, two re-
gions were chosen to capture different business models
Table 1. Characteristics of cases and the number of completed household surveys, by category.
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Country Kenya Mozambique Mozambique
Region Nanyuki Gurué Monapo
Households per category (total) (488) (169) (207)
Employed (E) a 48 b,c 37 60
Non-engaged (NE) a 270 b,c 22 29
Counterfactual (CF) 170 b 110 118
Notes: a LAI area; b Weigthed; c Aggregated. Source: Afgroland (2016, 2017).
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and agro-ecological conditions. In both regions, a factual
and counterfactual sub-location were chosen and house-
holds randomly selected (Reys, 2016). The households of
the Gurué and Monapo regions were not weighted be-
cause of the agro-ecological heterogeneity of the differ-
ent regions.
In both countries, the households within a LAI area
were categorised as ‘Employed’ (E) if minimally one
household member worked at a LAI and categorised as
‘Non-engaged’ (NE) when no-one was employed by a LAI.
The households in the counterfactual areas were cate-
gorised as ‘Counterfactual’ (CF). In Kenya, the employed
and non-engaged categories were aggregated across the
sub-locations. In each country, enumerator teams con-
sisted of trained nationals. The enumerators selected
the household closest to each random point and invited
the head of the household, or if absent the spouse, for
an interview. If both the households’ head and spouse
were absent, the enumerators moved to the next clos-
est household. This survey was complemented with in-
terviews of actors in the distribution system, decision-
makers, and civil society actors. The research design is
between-groups analysis, which focuses on examining
differences between groups.
4. Results and Discussion
4.1. General Characteristics of the Households
In Kenya, the average household had 4.2 (± 2) mem-
bers with a median age of 24 years, and 22.7% were
female-headed.Most households (75.7%)migrated from
a nearby area, 9.9% migrated from far away, and only
14% originated from the study area. More households
in the LAI area were immigrants compared to the CF
area. The main reason for migration was land (80.6%),
followed by work (12.3%), and family (6.3%). In the
LAI area, work was more important, and land less, for
migration compared to the CF area. The main annual
crops grown were maize, potato, wheat, and beans. In
Mozambique, the average household had 4.7 (± 2) mem-
bers with a median age of 15 years old, and 12.2% were
female-headed. Most households originated from the
area (55.9%), 14.9% migrated from nearby, and 29.3%
migrated from far away. The family was the main rea-
son formigration (64.7%), followed bywork (25.7%), and
family (7.4%). In both cases, migration to the LAI areas
wasmore driven bywork, and land less, compared to the
CF areas. In Case 2, the LAI area had a similar proportion
of migrants than the CF area, but in Case 3 the LAI area
had more migrants. The main annual crops grown were
manioc, maize, beans, and sorghum.
4.2. Food System Changes
The key households’ statements and characteristics are
presented by case and household’s category in Table 2.
Overall, the effects of LAI differed by country, case, and
category. Notably, other pressures besides LAIs, such as
economic development and demographic growth, were
prevalent in the study areas. However, depending on the
case, there were indications that LAIs impacted land ac-
cess and availability, migration, agri-engagement, food
distribution channels, and food environments. Generally,
while traditional dynamics thrived, the households in the
LAI areas were more part of a ‘modern’ food systems
than CF areas.
The effects of LAIs on land differed according to the
case’s country. Between 96.6% and 100% of Kenyan and
Mozambican households had access to land, and the to-
tal land size per household was generally higher in the
CF areas compared to the LAI areas. In Kenya, LAIs had
more impact on land access than availability, while in
Mozambique, this was the opposite. In Kenya, no LAI
caused direct land dispossession, but 48.1% of house-
holds in the factual area perceived the LAIs as negatively
impacting land availability. In Mozambique, the LAIs dis-
possessed 26.6% of households in the factual areas of
land. In both Mozambican cases, land dispossession was
lower for those households that worked at the farms.
In interviews, employees of the LAIs indicated an ar-
rangement to continue farming on another part of the
LAI’s land, while non-employees were expelled. None
of the dispossessed households received compensation.
Interestingly, 69.4% of households in the factual areas
did not perceive the LAIs as impacting land availability,
which suggests that, while Mozambican LAIs evict small-
scale farmers of the land, other stocks of land was avail-
able for farmers.
Overall, Kenya’s CF area had less agri-engagement
than the LAI area, which was the reverse inMozambique.
In Kenya, interviewees indicated that youth worked at
LAIs to raise capital for their own farms. As a result, the
CF area had fewer increases in agri-engagement because
its youth lacked this opportunity for capital access. In
Mozambique, agricultural disengagement was lower in
CF areas (0.9% to 4.2%) than LAI areas (9.1% to 30%),
possibly because of higher land dispossession and em-
ployment opportunities by the LAIs. In Kenya, animal
ownership was high (89.5% to 94.1%) for all categories,
whileMozambican ownership varied considerably by cat-
egory, but was higher in Case 2 than Case 3. In Kenya and
Mozambique, most of the annual produce grown was
kept for self-consumption. However, diets were more
sourced from food purchases, such asmarkets and shops,
than self-production. None sold to supermarkets, al-
though fewhouseholds sold their crops to agribusinesses
in Kenya (0% to 2.9%). In Kenya, most of the sales were
to middlemen, with few households that sold directly to
markets. The households with a LAI employee kept least
of their produce and sold most, while the CF area pro-
duced more for the diets. In Mozambique, the CF areas
sold more of their produce compared to the LAI areas.
Overall, the markets, rather than the middlemen, were
the most important channels of sale. The diets in the CF
area were more derived from self-production than the
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Table 2. Selected households’ statements and characteristics regarding land, food production, food distribution, the food environment, and diets, by case and household’s category.
Values indicate the percentage of households unless indicated otherwise.
Case 1 a Case 2 Case 3
E NE CF E NE CF E NE CF
Land (N = 956) (N = 5056) (N = 680) (n = 37) (n = 22) (n = 100) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
HHs with land access 100 98.5 99.4 97.3 100 98.2 96.7 96.6 100
Total land size (N = 956) (N = 5056) (N = 680) (n = 37) (n = 22) (n = 100) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
Mean (ha) 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.4 1.7 1.9 2.4
SD 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.8 2.4 2.6 1.7 1.7 2.1
Land loss by LAIs (N = 956) (N = 5056) (N = 680) (n = 36) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
% of HHs 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.2 31.8 0.0 23.3 41.4 0.0
% of HHs reporting a perception (N = 956) (n = 5056) (N = 680) (n = 36) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
…that LAIs reduce available land 57.9 46.3 9.4 30.6 36.4 1.8 25.0 37.9 0.8
Food production
Agri-engagement
over ten years (N = 956) (N = 4996) (N = 680) (n = 36) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
More 10.4 4.7 7.1 0.0 9.1 3.6 5.0 3.4 1.7
Less 6.0 14.1 22.9 19.4 9.1 0.9 30.0 27.6 4.2
Animal ownership (N = 956) (N = 4996) (N = 680) (n = 37) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
91.6 89.5 94.1 54.1 18.2 58.2 23.3 31.0 32.2
Food distribution
Main sale channels for produce b (n = 1419) (n = 6885) (n = 960) (n = 115) (n = 81) (n = 397) (n = 136) (n = 65) (n = 340)
Middlemen 43.6 31.6 33.4 1.1 0.0 5.9 7.0 0.0 10.7
No sale 43.3 61.0 51.5 81.1 86.2 56.8 51.2 82.2 42.8
Markets 4.6 1.9 3.3 9.5 10.3 25.2 21.7 13.3 32.4
Agribusiness 2.9 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Other 5.6 5.5 11.1 8.3 3.5 12.1 20.1 4.5 14.1
Channels to obtain food groups (N = 956) (N = 5014) (N = 680) (n = 37) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
Self-production 20.2 18.9 29.5 29.1 32.1 37.0 19.6 20.0 28.0
Markets 42.5 44.3 38.9 40.2 36.4 28.9 55.4 56.5 46.9
Shop 33.7 34.8 29.9 4.7 4.5 5.7 0.8 0.0 1.5
Other 3.6 2.0 1.8 26.0 27.0 28.4 24.2 23.5 23.6
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Table 2. (Cont.) Selected households’ statements and characteristics regarding land, food production, food distribution, the food environment, and diets, by case and household’s
category. Values indicate the percentage of households unless indicated otherwise.
Case 1 a Case 2 Case 3
E NE CF E NE CF E NE CF
Food environment
Distance to agri-lands (N = 956) (N = 4949) (N = 676) (n = 34) (n = 21) (n = 108) (n = 58) (n = 28) (n = 118)
With the house 96.9 95.5 95.3 55.9 57.1 63.0 65.5 57.1 64.4
< 30 min 0.0 1.7 3.6 26.5 9.5 17.6 8.6 14.3 5.1
> 1 hour 3.1 0.2 1.2 5.9 14.3 9.3 17.2 14.3 14.4
Distance to markets (N = 956) (N = 5037) (N = 680) (n = 36) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 119)
< 30 min 34.7 17.7 15.9 24.3 22.7 0.9 60.0 62.1 71.2
> 1 hour 15.2 25.8 39.4 10.8 18.2 80. 15.0 17.2 11.9
FES c (N = 956) (N = 5056) (N = 680) (n = 35) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
Mean 43.0 42.1 39.5 73.8 85.1 85.0 80.0 82.2 85.9
SD 23.7 22.3 24.0 24.6 10.6 15.6 22.9 19.1 12.8
Share of self-production in FES
Mean 24.1 23.5 35.9 56.3 63.5 69.1 43.7 51.1 58.7
SD 16.1 21.0 22.7 25.8 24.7 25.1 19.5 20.3 19.1
Diets
Days per week consumption of (N = 956) (N = 5056) (N = 680) (n = 37) (n = 22) (n = 110) (n = 60) (n = 29) (n = 118)
…Cereals 5.8 6.3 6.6 4.4 4.1 4.8 4.7 4.0 3.8
…Tubers 4.3 4.0 4.4 4.1 4.2 3.9 3.8 4.2 4.7
…Meat 1.0 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.8 0.5 0.9
…Oil and fat 7.0 7.0 6.8 3.3 3.4 3.0 5.1 4.4 4.4
…Sweets 6.0 5.8 5.6 1.9 1.6 1.2 2.4 2.3 1.5
Notes: CF (Counterfactual); NE (Non-engaged); E (Employed); HHs (Households); FES (Food Expenditure Share). a Weighted data. b Per plot of land. c The FES includes the approximate value of self-produced
goods that the households consumed in the last 30 days. Source: Afgroland (2016, 2017).
Politics and Governance, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 4, Pages 178–189 185
LAI areas, which were more dependent on markets and
shops. Case 2 relied less on the markets for their diets
than Case 3.
The food environments, particularly the Food
Expenditure Share (FES), differed between the cases. In
Kenya, about 95% of the agricultural lands were posi-
tioned next to the house, which was maximum 65.5%
in Mozambique. However, Mozambican households had
access to more plots than Kenyan households, so dedi-
cated agri-plots were more scattered. The combination
of high self-production and close access to agri-lands cre-
ated a locally-rooted food system configuration, namely
producing most of the household diet on a plot near the
homestead. In Kenya, the LAI area was closer to markets
than the CF area. In Case 2, the CF area was more iso-
lated from markets, as 80% of the CF area was > 1 hour
away compared to 13.6% in the LAI areas. In Case 3, the
CF was slightly closer to a market than the LAI area.
The share of food expenses in the household’s
budget—FES—was similar within the countries, which
was between 39.5% to 43% in Kenya, and 73.8% to 85.9%
in Mozambique. The high FES of Mozambique show-
cased the precarious situation of the households, with
high vulnerability to either rising food prices, loss of har-
vest, or declining incomes. In all cases, the CF areas self-
produced more of their food budget than the LAI areas.
In Kenya, an average CF household produced 35.9% of
their food budget, compared to 23.6% in the LAI area.
In Case 2, 69.1% came from self-production in the CF
area, compared to 59.1% in the LAI area. For Case 3, self-
production contributed to 58.7% of the CF’s area mean
food budget and 46.1% of the LAIs. Some food groups
were selected to compare diet composition, as particu-
larly higher consumption of meat, oil, fat, and sweets,
and lower consumption of cereals and tubers connects
with more ‘modern’ diets (HLPE, 2017). The differences
between food group consumption by case and category
were minor. The CF areas consumed less oil, fat, and
sweets than the LAI areas, but the magnitude of the dif-
ferences was small. Overall, no categories differed more
than one day of consumption per case.
4.3. Food Democracy between Process and Outcome
The impacts of LAIs on food systems change were com-
plex, context-specific, and operated on a background of
other social and economic changes. The analysis shows
that the LAIs, depending on the case, impacted land ac-
cess and availability, agri-engagement, food distribution
channels, and food environments. This section has two
aims: First, to reflect on the changes in food democ-
racy by the prevalence of small farms, local food, street
markets, and lower frequency of sugar and fat-dense
foods; and second, to discuss if potentially increased lo-
cal citizen’s power and control would counteract these
changes or embrace them. This reflection varies due to
the heterogeneity of the cases, particularly between the
two countries. The LAIs did ‘modernise’ the food sys-
tems in which they operated, although competing tra-
ditional elements, such as LAI employees that invested
in small-scale farming, were as well prevalent. The com-
peting traditional elements illustrate that the moderni-
sation processes were not linear, but hybrid, and results
in an unclear picture of how the trajectories of food sys-
tems would develop over time. Instead of a linear tran-
sition between traditional and modern food systems, a
localised hybrid configuration forms with no defined out-
come. Agri-policies often overlook the hybridity of food
systems, exemplified by ‘repeasantisation,’ by relying on
aggregated statistics (van der Ploeg, 2018).
First, because of historical land relations in the
Kenyan study areas, LAIs did not directly dispossess
households but decreased the amount of available
land. The engagement of households in agriculture was
stronger in the LAI areas than in the CF areas, which can
be driven by a lack of opportunities to raise capital, which
LAIs can provide. In the last years, several supermar-
kets opened in the Kenyan study area and more shops
were present in the LAI areas. However, all categories
obtainedmost of their diets through self-production and
informal markets. These informal markets were a crucial
livelihood strategy, as high land prices provided an ob-
stacle to small-scale farming. The differences in energy-
dense food consumption were small. Thus, the changes
in Lang’s food democratic characteristics were mostly re-
lated to land availability and the development of super-
markets. In opposition to Lang’s conceptualisation, in-
creased citizen’s power and control are unlikely to lead
to the removal of LAIs, as Zaehringer, Wambugu et al.
(2018) found that most interviewed farmers in the study
area preferred the LAIs to stay. Rather than land, inter-
viewees were displeased with the LAIs about compet-
ing natural resources, particularly water, low wages, ir-
regular pay, and the difficulty of taking leave. While cit-
izens’ participation could improve the employment is-
sues, it is unlikely thatmost householdswould favour LAI-
based development to dedicated pro-poor investments,
such as in small-scale farmer production. Lastly, super-
markets established themselves in the main town, but
sold few fresh fruit and vegetables. Outside of town, the
informal chains sold supermarket products in the study
areas, showcasing a ‘modern-to-traditional’ value chain
(Gómez & Ricketts, 2013), which diversified food avail-
ability and generated employment. However, when su-
permarkets expand their stock and reach, increased citi-
zen’s power is unlikely to allow supermarkets to compete
directly with traditional fresh fruit and vegetable mar-
kets. Overall, even in the ‘extreme’ example of LAIs, lo-
cal perspectives challenge what could, and could not, be
included in a democratic food system.
Second, in the Mozambican study areas, LAIs dispos-
sessed households of land and lowered agri-engagement
of households. Self-production was more important for
CF areas, and the LAI areas were more dependent on
themarkets for their dietary needs. Generally, traditional
value chains were more present than modern chains, as
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the area lacked supermarkets and almost all the food
trade was informal. The differences in energy-dense
food consumption were small, but higher than in Kenya.
The changes in food democracy characteristics by LAIs
connect to land, agri-engagement, and market depen-
dence,whichwere all related to LAI’s land dispossessions.
As Zaehringer, Atumane et al. (2018) noted, most small-
scale farmers around the study areas wanted the LAIs
to leave. While interviewees were positive about em-
ployment generated by LAIs, they were displeased about
land dispossessions. In this regard, increased citizens’
participation could contribute to the removal of LAIs
and provide a bulwark against land speculation and pro-
tect small-scale farmers’ agri-engagement. More disad-
vantages were reported because of the stronger power
disparities in Mozambique. Reducing these disparities
through citizen’s participation can change the balance
between disadvantages and advantages of LAIs, alike the
Kenyan case, where LAIs provide more benefits but are
unlikely to be a preferred development trajectory.
5. Conclusion
This study adds empirical findings to the discussion on
LAIs’ impacts on food systems change and food democ-
racy through case studies in Kenya and Mozambique.
This article used Lang’s food democracy characteristics
to reflect on the food system changes in the study ar-
eas, which in turn is used to discuss the concept of food
democracy. Particularly, a tension in food democracy as
a process of increased citizen’s participation, power, and
control, and as an outcome related to small farms and
local markets is debated. In Kenya, changes include land
availability and an influx of supermarkets. Increased cit-
izens’ control might not lead to LAI’s removal, but bet-
ter employment and limits on supermarket competition
with fresh fruit and vegetable markets. In Mozambique,
changes include land availability, agri-engagement, and
market dependence. Because of stronger power dispari-
ties, more disadvantages were reported in Mozambique,
which could lead to the removal of LAI companies when
local communities gain more decision-making power.
Thus, the outcome of increased food democracy is likely
to be different for each case, indicating that even in the
‘extreme’ example of LAIs, local perspectives challenge
what could, and could not, be included in a food demo-
cratic system. As a result, a process of increased democ-
racy might lead to diverse local food system arrange-
ments which are different from Lang’s food democracy.
With more power, local actors can better negotiate the
advantages and disadvantages of traditional and mod-
ern food systems and shape their own local food sys-
tem trajectory. Given the increased complexity of food
systems, this trajectory is then likely to be more hybrid
than lineary traditional or modern. In the end, the re-
flection of food democracy through LAIs show its multi-
dimensionality, with food democracy being simultane-
ously a process, outcome, set of policies, and a norma-
tive framework. Future research that starts from the ten-
sions between these dimensions can further clarify and
strengthen the concept of food democracy. This is neces-
sary if food democracy is to be used in policy debates in
Africa and beyond.
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